Col Guru Saday Batabyal (Retd), New Delhi

At the edge of the Bay of Bengal, where the intricate waterways of the Sundarbans—the largest delta in the world flow into the sea, Mongla Port has emerged as a powerful symbol of Bangladesh’s economic ambitions and its shifting strategic alignments.

Two-thirds of this vast mangrove ecosystem lies within Bangladesh, while one-third extends into India’s West Bengal, binding geography even as policy directions slowly diverge. Located roughly 80 kilometres from the Indian border, Mongla is no longer a peripheral facility; it is steadily becoming a focal point of trade, connectivity and geopolitical recalibration.

The port’s growing economic relevance is evident in its recent performance. In FY 2024–25, Mongla handled 10.41 million tonnes of cargo, processed 21,456 TEUs (twenty feet equivalent units-containers) and received 830 foreign vessels, generating Tk 343.33 crore in revenue and Tk 62.1 crore in net profit. In FY 2025–26, growth has continued, with 8.26 million tonnes of cargo and 21,651 TEUs handled in just seven months, while vessel arrivals crossed 500. Improved dredging and navigability now allow larger vessels, boosting efficiency. The port is also a key entry point for over 11,500 reconditioned vehicles annually. Imports—led by coal, clinker, fertiliser and food grains dominate, while exports include jute and agricultural goods, reinforcing Mongla’s role as a multimodal hub for southwestern Bangladesh.

This rise, however, cannot be understood without acknowledging India’s role in building crucial connectivity. For years, Mongla remained underutilised due to its weak hinterland links. That changed with India’s intervention, most notably through the Khulna–Mongla railway line, a 65-kilometre project financed through Indian concessional funding. This link connected the port directly to Bangladesh’s rail network, fundamentally improving cargo mobility and commercial viability.

India’s support extended beyond rail connectivity. It opened transit access to Mongla for moving goods to India’s north-eastern states, supported cross-border rail projects, and invested in energy infrastructure such as the Maitree thermal power plant near Mongla.

The port was also envisaged as a key component of India’s “Look East” (later Act East) policy framework, intended to integrate South Asia with Southeast Asia through improved connectivity. In that broader vision, Mongla was not merely a Bangladeshi asset but a shared regional gateway.

That framework, however, has taken a discernible setback. The Indian-backed economic zone near Mongla covering around 110 acres and agreed under a 2015 bilateral arrangement remained stalled for years due to lack of progress on implementation. Delays in project execution and limited movement on land development meant that the initiative failed to take off despite its strategic importance.

In 2025, under the Yunus-led interim administration, Bangladesh scrapped the Indian Economic Zone project, citing prolonged inactivity and missed deadlines. While India’s inconsistency in advancing the project contributed to this outcome, the unilateral manner of cancellation—without a negotiated settlement or restructuring came as a shock and was widely seen as not in keeping with established diplomatic practice. The move marked a clear departure from earlier patterns of cooperation.

The shift became more pronounced during Prime Minister Tarique Rahaman’s recent visit to Beijing. Among the key outcomes of the visit was a series of agreements with China, including a commitment to modernise and expand Mongla Port and to develop a Chinese-backed economic zone on the same land that had earlier been allocated to India. This effectively places Mongla within China’s expanding network of infrastructure partnerships.

Financially, Bangladesh’s engagement with China has deepened over the past decade, with Chinese financing supporting major infrastructure projects. Outstanding debt to China is currently estimated at around $5.5–5.7 billion, while cumulative loan commitments are closer to $8–9 billion, reflecting the broader scale of project financing. These figures sit within a wider framework of pledges, including the approximately $20 billion announced in 2016, only part of which has been realised, alongside more recent commitments of about $2.1 billion. At the same time, Bangladesh’s external debt servicing burden has risen significantly, exceeding $4 billion annually in FY 2024–25, highlighting growing repayment pressures.

The structure of Chinese loans adds to long-term concerns. Compared to multilateral financing, these loans often have shorter repayment periods and tighter terms, compressing repayment timelines and placing pressure on foreign exchange reserves. Although Bangladesh’s macroeconomic position remains relatively stable, the cumulative effect of rising debt obligations poses a structural risk over time.

Strategic implications now extend beyond the Bay of Bengal into the wider Indian Ocean—long within India’s sphere of primacy. Modern ports are inherently dual-use: deep berths, logistics networks, and digital systems that enable commerce can also support surveillance and strategic access. Mongla’s proximity to India’s eastern seaboard sharpens these risks, with a sustained external presence capable of monitoring shipping lanes and naval activity across the Bay and beyond. What appears commercial thus carries clear security overtones, eroding India’s maritime advantage and turning a once uncontested domain into a competitive theatre.

For India, this marks both an economic and strategic setback. Mongla was integral to the Look East vision of regional connectivity and alternative maritime access; its dilution weakens that framework. Simultaneously, China’s entry effectively adds Mongla as another “pearl” in its expanding “String of Pearls”—extending Beijing’s influence across the Indian Ocean in a region India has traditionally regarded as its strategic backyard.

India’s response is likely to be measured but firm—strengthening its own eastern maritime infrastructure, enhancing coastal surveillance, and deepening partnerships with countries such as Japan. It will also need to re-engage Bangladesh with greater consistency and speed in delivering projects if it is to retain strategic relevance.

Domestic political dynamics within Bangladesh also play a role in shaping these choices. The growing influence of Jamaat-e-Islami, now a significant political actor and an ally of the BNP, adds complexity. Historically, segments of the BNP have been less favourably inclined towards India. Coupled with this is an undercurrent of anti-India sentiment among sections of the population. While not dominant, such sentiment influences policy direction, encouraging diversification of partnerships while avoiding overt antagonism.

There is, finally, a historical irony that lends deeper context. During the 1971 Liberation War, China supported Pakistan and opposed Bangladesh’s independence, recognising the country only on August 31, 1975- a fortnight after the assassination of Mujibur Rahman and establishing diplomatic relations shortly thereafter on October 4, 1975. India, in contrast, played a decisive role in Bangladesh’s liberation and contributed significantly to its early development. Yet, over time, strategic and economic considerations appear to be outweighing historical memory in shaping present choices.

Mongla Port thus stands at a crossroads. Its rising trade volumes and improving performance highlight its economic promise. But its evolving ownership patterns and strategic alignment reflect a broader shift in South Asia’s geopolitical landscape. For Bangladesh, the challenge lies in balancing development with sustainability and autonomy. For India, it is a reminder that influence in the neighbourhood must be constantly nurtured.

In the shifting currents of the Bay of Bengal, Mongla is no longer just a port—it is a marker of changing tides in regional power, where opportunity and competition now move side by side.

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(The author is an Indian Army veteran. The opinions expressed in this article are personal.)

Dhaka, 21st November 2025 

Dhaka, 19th November 2025